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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the State of Utah's right to the subject property did not vest before 
expiration of the 1974 judgment, the State of Utah lost its right to the subject property. 
This means that the trial court erred in upholding the recording of an expired judgment. 
This Court should find that the law in Utah is that expired judgments cannot be recorded 
against real property. In addition, this Court should find that adverse possession against 
the State of Utah is available in certain circumstances and that this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a trial on the adverse possession issues. Finally, if the 
Court disagrees with Appellant on the previous two issues, then the Court should exercise 
its equitable powers requiring that the State of Utah reimburse Appellant for all property 
taxes paid to Weber County for the years that the State failed to record its judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE STATE OF UTAH'S RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
njn TVQT VEST BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE JUDGMENT, THE STATE 
OF UTAH LOST ITS RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY. 
A. VESTING OF THE STATE'S REAL PROPERTY RIGHT DID NOT 
OCCUR BEFORE THE 1974 JUDGMENT EXPIRED. 
The central issue in this case is whether or not the State can record an expired 
judgment to vest property for which a condemnation judgment had been entered in 1974. 
The conclusion should be and is that the recording of an expired judgment is invalid. 
The trial court found that the applicable statute which was enforceable at the time 
of the 1974 condemnation judgment essentially states that vesting occurs at the time of 
i 
recording. See, Decision dated July 2, 2007 pp. 4-5 attached to Appellant's Opening 
Brief as Appendix 4. See also, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 formerly codified at 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15. The trial court, however, did not construe this statute 
properly in light of the fact that judgments in Utah expire after eight years. Because the 
judgment expired eight years after entry, there were no rights to vest in the State of Utah 
when the judgment was finally recorded in 2003. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 
(previously encoded as Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15) provides as follows concerning 
condemnation vesting procedures: 
When payments have been made and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects 
to give one, as required by § 78-34-13 and § 78-34-14, the court must make 
a final judgment of condemnation, which must describe the property 
condemned and the purpose of such condemnation. A copy of the 
judgment must be filed in the office of the recorder of the county, 
thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the Plaintiff for the 
purpose therein specified. [Emphasis added]. 
Thus, the simple statutory language from 1974 (and which basically continues 
today at § 78B-6-516) is that the property under a condemnation action does not vest in 
the State of Utah until the condemnation judgment is recorded. This is a statutory vesting 
requirement. The trial court erred in not enforcing this requirement. The trial court 
construed the statutes erroneously. A proper interpretation of the case law and the 
statutes is that the recording of a judgment after eight years is ineffective. Surely this 
court would not approve of the enforceability of the recordation of any other judgment 
which was recorded beyond the eight year period. This would have the effect of making 
a judgment enforceable beyond the initial eight year period. The deadline for recording 
the judgment must necessarily be the effective date of the judgment which is eight years. 
The State of Utah had the option of either recording the judgment within the eight year 
period or renewing that judgment with a new lawsuit for further enforcement before the 
expiration of the eight year period. Neither of these events occurred. 
The State has failed to address this argument at each stage of this action. The 
State has offered no explanation as to why the judgment was not recorded in Weber 
County while it was recorded in Davis County. Obviously, the State knew that it had to 
record the document because it did so in Davis County. Whether the State deliberately 
failed to record the document or whether the State accidentally failed to record the 
document is unknown because the trial court made its ruling before the facts could be 
discovered. However, the reason for non-recording is immaterial because the fact is that 
the judgment was not recorded before the judgment expired. 
It is longstanding law that the judgments in Utah are only valid for eight (8) years. 
The recording of a stale judgment has no legal effect whatsoever. An interesting case 
which discusses the eight year validity requirement and the eight (8) year statute of 
limitation for renewing judgments is Fisher v. Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198 (Utah 2004). In that 
case, the court discussed that judgments are valid in Utah for eight (8) years based upon 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 (predecessor to § 78B-5-202(l)). Thus, it is clear from 
the Fisher case that judgments expire in Utah after eight (8) years. Id. at 1199-1200. 
Another interesting case is Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 
1999). In Kessimakis the court found that attempts to enforce a divorce judgment 
requiring execution and delivery of appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of an 
interest were not enforceable after the eight (8) year statute of limitations, because the 
judgment had expired. 
"Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 (1987) establishes an eight (8) year statute of 
limitations for the enforcement of judgments...^ See. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 
1142 (Utah, 1991). In addition, another case talks about the "statutory life" of a 
judgment. See, Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988). In Cox Corp. the 
Supreme Court of Utah found that a judgment lien cannot extend beyond the statutory life 
of the judgment which is eight years and thus rejected a renewal of a judgment under the 
applicable statues which include Utah Code Annotated § 78-22-1. Id. at 939. 
In Potomac Leasing Company v. Pasco Technology Corporation, 10 P.3d 972 
(Utah 2000) the court made it clear that judgments are valid and enforceable for eight (8) 
years. The court further found that the registering or filing of a foreign judgment in Utah 
is an wtaction" contrary to the assertions made by a party in that case. 
In Gilroy v. Lowe. 626 P.2d 469 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
an execution sale on October 22, 1979 which related to a judgment issued on October 22, 
1971 was timely because it occurred within eight (8) years after entry of judgment. 
Execution on judgments cannot issue after the statutory period of eight (8) years has 
lapsed. Therefore, recording should similarly not be available after eight years. An eight 
year limitation on enforcement of judgments should apply to any action, including the act 
of recording a judgment. Thus, all of the case law demonstrates that judgments are only 
valid for eight years, and there is no exception for recordation. This Court should not 
allow such because it would be contrary to case law and would have no precedent. 
It is clear from the above analysis that each time that the Utah Supreme Court or 
Utah Court of Appeals has discussed the issue of enforceability of judgments, they have 
always limited the effectiveness of judgments in Utah to eight years. In its brief the 
State of Utah asserts that the eight year period does not apply. This should not be the law 
in Utah. The State should be responsible to follow its own procedures in condemnation 
actions. The State has shown no rule, statute or case which shows that a judgment after 
eight years is enforceable in any way including the recording thereof 
In summary, condemnation actions require recording of the judgment before 
actual vesting to the State of Utah. See, § 78B-6-516 formerly § 78-34-15. Even though 
a judgment for condemnation had been entered, it is not the entry of the judgment which 
transfers title but recording of the deed. In other words, at the time that the State 
obtained a condemnation judgment against Higley, the State was required to record the 
judgment before vesting occurs. Judgments in Utah are good for eight (8) years. The 
judgment was not recorded within eight (8) years, but rather was recorded in 2003, 
approximately twenty-nine (29) years after the judgment had been obtained. This Court 
should find that the recording of the judgment which had expired was ineffective as 
against the title to the property held by Plaintiff at the time that the judgment was 
recorded in Weber County. The State did not follow the plain requirements of the 
condemnation statute. Mr. Higley continued paying taxes on the property, continued 
using the property and continued as the record owner of the property during all material 
times until it passed to his heirs upon his death in 2002. 
B. THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES IS 
ERRONEOUS. 
In its brief, the State of Utah characterizes the recording of the judgment as 
"clerical". However, Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15 does not read as such. The 
statute specifically requires the recording of the judgment before vesting occurs. 
Obviously the State of Utah knew that it had to record the judgment because it recorded 
the judgment in Davis County, but for whatever reason failed to record it in Davis 
County. The vesting requirement failed as it relates to any property located in Weber 
County because the State of Utah did not follow the statute by recording it in Weber 
County. The State of Utah has not adequately responded to this argument and therefore 
its argument fails. This is a simple statutory requirement that the State failed to fulfill, 
and the legislature obviously deemed it important for the recording to occur which is a 
material element of the condemnation process to notify others. Because it is statutorily 
required it cannot be ignored. 
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record judgments. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-202(7)(d). However, said statute was 
only recently enacted in 2008 and does not have retroactive application in this situation. 
Moreover, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 still requires recording. The law at the 
time of entry of the judgment both in 1974 and at the time of expiration of the judgment 
was that judgments are good for eight (8) years. The State had a duty to record the 
judgment in order for title to vest and failed to comply with its vesting requirements and 
therefore title to the property never transferred to the State of Utah. 
Ihe State further asserts thai u^ Liah Lodv, Annotated § / 8-12-^2 ib i^i 
applicable because it is not applicable to real property. ' I<>\\e\er, this is inaccurate 
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judgment, the State obtained the i ight to i ecord the council : 
receive vesting of iille h> ihc .ubjeu piopert\ H. die State failed to record before tlle 
judgiilent expired because tl.. i.ii. ; . • ^ statutory procedures, the State 
si lould fail oi i tl lis •.>.*: < \ 
unenforceable after eight years. 11I11v when the Suuc failed to record p;,v>i u, a^ 
judgment M.>niL. its enfbreeabi!it\ the *st*Me ahn lost the rirht to record r.\a\ . 
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then the next issue is whether ,,, ..u, «d\usc possession can be obtained again&l die State 
of IJtah. Even if Appellant loses under its first argumein (hi-* (\>url slmuld Mi!* remand 
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circumstances pertaining to the adverse possession issue because the trial coiiiI siniply 
(li'.iinsM'd liliic > i * I \ ci'.c possession chiiin aganr.l Ilk1 Slate luiding as a matter of law that 
adverse possession is unavailable aganiM UIL : 
under Hinited circumstances such as those thai exist here and as is more fully set forth in 
its opening brief that adverse possession can be obtained by a citizen against the State of 
Utah. 
In its brief, the State has failed to show why adverse possession should not be 
applicable against the State given the current circumstances. Therefore, this Court should 
find that the trial court should conduct a trial on the issue of adverse possession against 
the State of Utah. 
The State has cited to no Utah case law or statute which disallows adverse 
possession against the State. There is a statute which specifically disallows adverse 
possession against towns, cities, and counties. See, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-216. 
But this statute does not say anything about whether adverse possession can be obtained 
against a State. It appears that this issue has not yet been addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in its case law. The State of Utah relies upon the Nyman case and the Fries case. 
However, neither of these cases are applicable because both of them discuss adverse 
possession against a county, not against the state. Thus, the statute at Utah Code 
Annotated § 78B-2-216 is inapplicable to this case. Said statute does not mention 
anything about adverse possession against the state and no case law has definitively set 
forth such a premise. 
The State's brief focuses more on the alleged public purpose issue and does not 
show how adverse possession, should not be allowed against the State of Utah. 
Appellant's opening brief sets forth the fact that there is no Utah statute or case law 
which absolutely disallows adverse possession against the State. Therefore, this Court 
should apply a rule which balances the interests of the competing policies. The rule 
siioiild be that when ihe Stale has not used iln- paKei 'hiea _ eotidemned lo: a public 
purpose and for V-IIKI. a u n . o i IKIS paid taxes continilously thereon for the statutory 
possession. I his should be espeeially true ioi this situation \viieic a was the State's 
failure to record which ua\e rise to the issues so long ago. 
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the property taxes stems directly from the State of Utah's inaction. This Court should 
direct the trial court to invoke its equitable powers to require such a payment by the State 
of Utah to Appellant. Had the State of Utah recorded its judgment as required by statute, 
this situation would not exist. Thus, on balance, the equities are in favor of Appellant for 
reimbursement of all taxes paid since 1974. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the State of Utah's right to the subject property did not vest before 
expiration of the 1974 judgment, the State of Utah lost its right to the subject property. 
This means that the trial court erred in upholding the recording of an expired judgment. 
This Court should find that the law in Utah is that expired judgments cannot be recorded 
against real property. In addition, this Court should find that adverse possession against 
the State of Utah is available in certain circumstances and that this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a trial on the adverse possession issues. Finally, if the 
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its equitable powers requiring that the State of Utah reimburse Appellant for all property 
taxes paid to Weber County for the years that the State failed to record its judgment. 
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